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Religious Freedom Issues in
Domestic Relations Law
Mitchell A. Tyner*
Domestic relations cases involving either judicial
preference among religious views and/or the right of parents to
inculcate religious values and beliefs in their children occur in
a narrow range of fact patterns and receive limited public
notice. But the inconsistency of both analysis and result should
give pause to those who take their religious liberty seriously.
Three areas in which religious freedom has troubled courts
are: (1) religious differences without more as a basis for the
divorce, (2) regulation of the custodial parents' right to give
religious instruction, and (3) custody grants based on the
religious preferences of the parents.
I.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES AS A BASIS FOR DIVORCE

The use of religious belief or practice as a ground for
divorce is rare, but the potential exists. In an Ohio case, 1 both
parents had been Catholic at marriage. 2 A year later the wife
became a Jehovah's Witness. 3 She stopped going to_ family
gatherings, refused to celebrate holidays, and a divorce action
followed shortly. 4
In affirming the divorce decree, the appellate court
distinguished between differences in religious faith and the
detrimental consequences that adherence to a particular faith
may have:
Although a difference in the religious faith of a spouse does
not constitute a ground for divorce, a religious conviction may

* Copyright 1993 by Mitchell A. Tyner, Esq., Associate General Counsel for
the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists.
B.A. Union College; M.A.
Andrews University; J.D. Nashville School of Law.
1 Pater v. Pater, No. C-890553, 1990 WL 162021 (Ohio App. Oct. 24, 1990).
2 Id. at *1.
3 ld.
4 ld.
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induce a spouse to do things that would constitute a ground
for a divorce. It is permissible for each spouse to have his or
her own religious beliefs, but if one carries such beliefs to the
extent of disrupting and destroying the family life, her
conduct may constitute extreme cruelty. 5

II.

CUSTODIAL AND NON-CUSTODIAL RELIGIOUS
INSTRUCTION RIGHTS

Far more common are cases in which a religious practice is
an issue in custody proceedings. A typical problem is
determining whether the non-custodial parent has a right to
teach religious values to the child. The standard in virtually
every jurisdiction is that the custodial parent determines
religious training. 6 But is that right exclusive or must it be
shared with the non-custodial parent?
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that right to be
non-exclusive. 7 The court addressed, (1) whether an order
prohibiting a father from taking his children to religious
services "contrary to the Jewish faith" during periods of lawful
custody violated his free exercise rights, and (2) whether the
father could be directed to present the children at synagogue
for religious services during his periods of weekend visitation. 8
The court ruled that (1) the restriction was unconstitutional, 9
and (2) the requirement was valid. 10
Pamela and David Zummo were married in 1978, had
three children and were divorced in 1988. 11 Pamela was
raised a Jew and actively practiced her faith since childhood. 12
David was raised a Roman Catholic but attended only
sporadically .13 Prior to marriage Pamela and David agreed
that any children would be raised in the Jewish faith. 14 The
trial court's order in their divorce action provided that David

5 Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
6 See generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of
Religion in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383
(1989).
7 Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
8 Id. at 1132.
9 Id. at 1157.
10 Id. at 1158.
11 Id. at 1141.
12 Id.
13 !d.
14 ]d.
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was not permitted to take the children to "religious services
contrary to the Jewish faith" 15 and that he was obligated
during his weekend visitations to arrange for the children's
synagogue attendance. 16 David appealed those sections of the
order, alleging breach of First Amendment protection. 17
The trial court noted six factors in support of the
challenged restrictions. 18 First, the Zummo's had orally agreed
to raise their children as Jews. 19 But, the appellate court
found:
[S]everal persuasive grounds [exist] upon which to deny legal
effect to such agreements: 1) such agreements are generally
too vague to demonstrate a meeting of minds, or to provide an
adequate basis for objective enforcement; 2) enforcement of
such an agreement would promote a particular religion, serve
little or no secular purpose, and would excessively entangle
the courts in religious matters; and 3) enforcement would be
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (as well as their
state equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and
change their beliefs, and that they be free to instruct their
children in accordance with those beliefs. 20

Therefore, said the court, the trial court erred in giving too
much deference to the pre-nuptial agreement. 21
The trial court also cited the children's pre-divorce
religious training and concluded that they had asserted
personal religious identities that must be respected. 22 The
appellate court doubted any such assertion by three, four and
eight-year-olds, and stated:
In order to avoid arrogating to itself unconstitutional
authority to declare orthodoxy in determining religious
identity, courts only recognize a legally cognizable religious
identity when such an identity is asserted by the child itself,
and then only if the child has reached sufficient maturity and
intellectual development to understand the significance of
such an assertion. We conclude that whatever religious
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

ld. at 1142.
I d.
I d.
I d.
!d.
ld. at 1144.
ld. at 1148.
[d.
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training the three, four, and eight-year-old children had
received, they lacked capacity to assert a legally cognizable
religious identity, and in fact, made no attempt to assert such
an identity; consequently, no legally cognizable religious
identity had been acquired. Consideration of the children's
presumed religious identity, under the circumstances
presented here, was constitutionally impermissible and an
abuse of discretion. 23

The trial court also opined that "stability and consistency
in a child's religious inculcation has been recognized as an
important factor in determining the best interest of the
child.'124 Again, the appeals court disagreed:
[W]e conclude that while the desire to provide or maintain
stability in the already tumultuous context of a divorce is
generally a significant factor in custody determinations,
courts constitutionally cannot have any interest in the
stability of a child's religious beliefs. The consideration of the
children's presumed interests in spiritual stability was
constitutionally impermissible and an abuse of discretion. 25

The trial court's fourth factor was the contrast between the
mother's active Judaism and the father's sporadic
Catholicism. 26 The Superior Court said:
[N]either determination of, nor consideration of, parents'
relative devoutness or activeness in religious activities has
any place in custody determinations. The United States
Supreme Court has held that "no person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, or for
church attendance or nonattendance," and that, "the
Establishment Clause at the very least, prohibits government
from ... making adherence to a religion relevant in any way
to a person's standing in the political community."27

Consideration of the parents' relative devoutness does precisely
what is forbidden.
Factor five was the trial court's perception that "the
practice of Judaism and that of Roman Catholicism cannot be
squared. To accept and adhere to the teachings of one
23 ld. at 1149.
24 ld. at 1150 (citation omitted).
25 ld. at 1152.
26 ld.
27 ld. (citations omitted).
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necessarily requires a rejection of the other."28 True or not,
said the higher court, this was improper.
[E]ven irreconcilable doctrinal differences in the religious
beliefs held by divorced parents would not provide a basis for
imposing restrictions upon a parent's visitation or joint
custody rights in absence of a showing of a substantial threat
of harm to the child arising from those differences in absence
of the proposed restrictions. 29
The trial court's sixth factor cited was the perceived
possibility of harmful effects from exposure to "inconsistent"
religions. 30 The appellate panel responded:
[E]ach parent must be free to provide religious exposure and
instruction as that parent sees fit, during any and all periods
of legal custody or visitation without restriction, unless the
challenged beliefs or conduct of the parent are demonstrated
to present a substantial threat of present or future, physical
or emotional harm to the child in the absence of the proposed
restriction . . . . [T]his standard requires proof of a
"substantial threat" rather than "some probability." We also
emphasize that while the harm involved may be present or
future harm, the speculative possibility of mere disquietude,
disorientation, or confusion arising from exposure to
"contradictory" religions would be a patently insufficient
"emotional harm" to justify encroachment by the government
upon constitutional parental and religious rights of parents,
even in the context of divorce. 31
In sum, the court held:
[l]n order to justify restrictions upon parent's rights to
inculcate religious beliefs in their children, the party seeking
the restriction must demonstrate by competent evidence that
the belief or practice of the party to be restricted actually
presents a substantial threat of present or future physical or
emotional harm to the particular child or children involved in
absence of the proposed restriction, and that the restriction is
the least intrusive means adequate to prevent the specified
harm. 32

28 ld. at
29 ld. at
30 ld.
31 ld. at
32 ld. at

1153 (citation omitted).
1154.
1154-55 (citations omitted).
1157.
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In this case, the mother did not meet this standard of proof.
Finally, on the issue of the requirement that David provide
for synagogue attendance during his visitation periods, the
court said:
The trial court found "little if any" distinction between
prohibiting the father's affirmative act of taking his children
to Catholic services and its direction that the father present
the children at the Synagogue for Sunday School. We, on the
other hand, find a material and controlling distinction; and
consequently, affirm that part of the order requiring the
father to present his children at the Synagogue for Sunday
School. 33

The Supreme Court of Nebraska gave lip service to the
non-custodial parent's right to share religious beliefs with his
children, yet allowed significant restrictions on that right in
actual practice. 34 In that case, as in the Ohio case, both
Edward and Diane LeDoux had been Catholic at the time of
their marriage. 35 Their children, Andrew and Peter, were
baptized in the Catholic faith. 36 In July, 1985, Edward began
worshipping as a Jehovah's Witness. 37 Diane and Edward
separated on April 1, 1986. 38 At the divorce trial, the principal
contested issues were visitation rights and specific restrictions
that Diane wished to impose on Edward with regard to his
religious activities with the children. 39
The trial court found that numerous differences existed in
both belief and practice between Catholics and Jehovah's
Witnesses. 4 ° Concluding that exposing the children to more
than one religious practice would have a deleterious effect on
them, the court awarded custody to Diane, established a strict
visitation schedule, and directed Edward not to "expose or
permit himself or any other person to expose the minor
children of the parties to any religious practices or teachings
that are inconsistent with the religious teachings espoused by
the [appellee], being the Catholic religion by which the children

33 ld. (citation omitted).
34 LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990).
35 ld. at 2.
36 ld. at 3.
37 ld.
38 ld.
39• ld.
40 ld. at 4.
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are being raised."41 It further ordered that while with the
children, Edward could not prevent them from engaging in
activities normally permitted by the Catholic religion. 42
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed and held that
courts have a duty to consider whether religious beliefs
threaten the health and well-being of a child. 43 Thus, "when a
court finds that particular religious practices pose an
immediate and substantial threat to a child's temporal wellbeing, a court may fashion an order aimed at protecting the
child from that threat."44 However, in so doing, "a court must
narrowly tailor its order to result in the least possible intrusion
upon constitutionally protected parental interests."45 The
court held that:
The order of the trial court is narrowly tailored in that it
imposes the least possible intrusion upon Edward LeDoux's
right of free exercise of religion and the custodial mother's
right to control the religious training of a child. The custodial
parent normally has the right to control the religious training
of the child. The dissolution decree merely forecloses the
exposure of the LeDoux children to those practices and
teachings which are inconsistent with the Catholic religion.
The appellant is free to discuss beliefs of the Jehovah's
Witnesses with his children so long as they are consistent
with the Catholic religion. 46

Justice Shanahan, in a lengthy dissent, concluded that:
What the majority has characterized as a "narrowly tailored"
visitation order is, in reality, a judicial straitjacket,
constricting Edward LeDoux and preventing him from
discussing with his children any religious belief or practice
which may contradict or conflict with Catholic doctrine. Thus,
the LeDoux visitation order prohibits Edward LeDoux's free
exercise of his religion in reference to his children and,
consequently, constitutes a denial of religious freedom
protected by the state and federal Constitutions. 47

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 4-5.
at 5.
(citations omitted).

at 5-6 (citation omitted).
at 12 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court of Montana dealt with the question of
how religious education compares with other custodial
issues. 48 The trial court awarded joint custody but concluded
that the child would live with his mother after age six in order
to facilitate school attendance. 49 The father argued that such
an arrangement effectively prevented him from sharing his
Jewish heritage with his son. 50 On appeal, the state high
court affirmed. 51 Although ruling that neither parent shall
have exclusive right to determine the child's religious education
and affiliation, the supreme court upheld the trial court's
residency scheme, observing that "an award of custody for the
purpose of religious education should not dominate other
elements which comprise the best interests of this particular
child."52
A Canadian court recently went much further, ruling that
the custodial parent has the sole and exclusive right to
determine religious training, restraining the father from even
discussing his religion with his children or taking them to
religious services and restraining both parties from making
adverse comments to the children about the other's religion. 53
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin recently agreed, 54 ruling
that a state statute gives the custodial parent the right to
choose the religion for the children, and construing it to provide
that parent with protection from subversion. 55

III.

CUSTODY GRANTS BASED ON RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES

Before courts may decide which parent controls religious
training, they must decide which parent wins custody of the
child. Here the decisions are at least as inconsistent and even
more troubling.
In an Ohio case,56 both parents had been Catholic at
marriage. 57 A year later the wife became a Jehovah's

48 In re Marriage of Gersovitz, 779 P.2d 883 (Mont. 1989).
49 ld. at 884.
50 ld. at 884-85.
51 ld. at 885.
52 ld.
53 Young v. Young, 24 R.F.L.3d 192 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1989). This case was
argued before the Supreme Court of Canada on January 25, 1993.
54 In re Marriage of Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
55 ld. at 146.
56 Pater v. Pater, No. C-890553, 1990 WL 162021 (Ohio App. Oct. 24, 1990).
57 ld. at *1.
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Witness. 58 She stopped going to family gatherings, refused to
celebrate holidays, and a divorce action followed shortly. 59 The
trial court awarded custody to the father and the mother
appealed, arguing that the court unconstitutionally based its
decision on her religious practices. 60 The Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed on the child custody issue:
[l]f [the mother] were granted custody, the child would be less
likely to receive proper medical attention, obtain a college
education, or participate in social activities at school or with
Robert's family. In addition, the child's relationship with his
father would be more likely to be severely damaged as a
result of [the mother's] belief that the Catholic Church and
Christmas are 'bad' and that non-Witnesses are evil. 61

Happily, the decision regarding child custody was
overturned by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 62 Said the state's
high court, focusing on the welfare of the child:
A parent may not be denied custody on the basis of his or her
religious practices unless there is probative evidence that
those practices will adversely affect the mental or physical
health of the child. Evidence that the child will not be
permitted to participate in certain social or patriotic activities
is not sufficient to prove possible harm. 63

In a Pennsylvania case, 64 the trial court found that the
father, with whom the children had lived after their mother
left, was an exemplary parent. 65 Nevertheless, the trial court
awarded the mother custody because the court disapproved of
the father's fundamentalist Christian beliefs and his
enrollment of the children in a religious school. 66 The trial
court stated:
[l]t is the degree to which the father has pursued "life in the
Lord" that has deprived the children of social and educational
opportunities and has presented them with a single-minded

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. at *2.
Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992).
ld. at 800.
Stolarick v. Novak, 584 A.2d 1034 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
ld. at 1035.
ld.
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approach to life that is very restricted in view and allows for
no spontaneity, artistic expression or individual development
of rationale or logic or even just pursuit of ordinary curiosity.
These children are being raised in a sterile world with very
rigid precepts, with no allowance for difference of opinion, and
no greater breadth than the doctrinaire limits of the religious
beliefs. 67

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding those
statements to be only the views of the trial judge, unsupported
by the record. 68 Said the court:
The record in the instant case reveals no basis for the trial
court's belief that the children's horizons would be broadened
by removing them from the "sterile" environment of a
religiously oriented school. Both parents adore the children
and are genuinely interested in playing a role in their future.
For five years since the separation of their parents, however,
they have lived with their father in a single residential home,
and their father has ably devoted himself to their care. Under
these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion
when it suddenly took them from the only home and family
which they have known and awarded them to another whose
facilities, if not inadequate, were less desirable and less
familiar than those to which the children had been
accustomed. 69

In virtually all American jurisdictions, the paramount
consideration in child custody proceedings is the best interest
of the child. 70 While that ideal is no doubt proper, its
attainment is a highly subjective task. Assumptions about
which interests are "best" for a child have been shaped by
history and dominant social custom. While such cultural
influences are not inherently objectionable, they may allow
stereotypes to influence a court's decision when one parent has
adopted the values of an unpopular religious minority. Courts
may be tempted to adopt some standardized "all-American"
ideal as their guide to a child's best interest.

67 Id. at 1036.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1038.
70 See generally JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 4.02
(1986); JoHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 10.02 (1987).
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A couple of commentators have explained the problem in
practical application of this amorphous "best interest"
standard:
Since the trial judge's decision will be reversed only upon
a clear showing of abuse, a judge might draft his custody
order to promote one belief over another to hide his
motivation within the side discretion afforded him by the
imprecision of the 'best interest' standard. 71
The reality is that the exercise of judicial discretion is far
less a product of the judge's learning than of his or her
temperament, background, interests and biases. 72

A disturbing example is seen in the case of Mendez v.
Mendez. 73 Rita and Ignacio Mendez were married in 1981. At
that time both considered themselves to be Roman Catholics,
although neither practiced that faith. During the course of
their marriage, they attended Catholic services on only three
occasions. 74
Rebecca Mendez, the couple's child, was born six months
after her parents' marriage. When she was approximately a
year old, Ignacio decided that Rebecca should be baptized as a
Catholic. Rita did not want Rebecca baptized but arranged for
it to please Ignacio. 75
In April 1983, Rita became involved in the Jehovah's
Witnesses faith. She thereafter became a practicing member of
that religion, which resulted in the onset of marital difficulties.
Ignacio believed that Jehovah's Witnesses were "totally
different" and "against society."76 He felt that his wife had
"betrayed him" by her conversion and ordered her to cease
attending Jehovah's Witnesses' meetings. 77 When she failed to

71 Steven M. Zarowny, Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After
Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 160, 165 (1980).
72 Dorinda N. Noble, Custody Contest: How to Divide and Reassemble a
Child, 64 Soc. CASEWORK 406, 407 (1983).
73 527 So. 2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
74 The facts concerning the Mendez' marriage, religious practices, divorce
and subsequent court action are essentially those set out in Rita Mendez' Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Menendez v. Menendez, 527 So.2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (No. 87-1166), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 942, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 1030 (1988)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
75 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at 4.
76 !d.
77 ld.
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do so, Ignacio petitioned for dissolution of the marriage and for
custody of Rebecca.
Religion was the central issue during the two-day custody
trial. The transcript of the divorce proceeding comprises four
volumes. Volumes one through three concern the custody issue
and consist of 485 pages. Volume four deals with financial
matters and is forty-five pages long. Of the 485 pages
concerning custody, 249 pages (51%) contain references to
religion. 78
At trial, Ignacio testified that he sought custody of Rebecca
because it was contrary to her best interest to be raised as a
Jehovah's Witness. He sought to bolster that allegation by the
testimony of two psychologists and one psychiatrist. However,
all agreed that Rita was the preferred custodial parent and was
the parent with whom Rebecca had the deepest attachment.
The court-appointed guardian ad litem concurred, testifying
that: "[Rebecca] was either going to cease living with her
father, which was going to be difficult for her, or she would
cease living with her mother, which was going to devastate
her." 79
The expert witnesses also agreed that Ignacio was not a
desirable custodial parent because he had no plans to care for
Rebecca. Ignacio testified that if he were awarded custody he
would either have to hire a live-in maid or else move to his
mother's home and live there with his sister and her two
children so that either his mother or his sister could care for
Rebecca. 80 Dr. Eli Levy, one of the psychologists, testified that
he would not recommend Ignacio as custodial parent for two
reasons: "One is the emotional state between the mother and
the child. That needs to be taken care of and guarded.
Secondly, my understanding of Mr. Ignacio's work is that the
man has to go to work and it requires travel at times out of the
city."81
Each of the experts and the guardian ad litem were
troubled by the "problem" of Rita's religion. The "problem"
according to Dr. Levy, was that Jehovah's Witnesses are
"different."82 According to Dr. Richard Greenbaum, the second

78 ld.

79 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at A24.
80 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 74, at 5-6.
81 ld. at 6.
82 ld. at 6-7.
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psychologist, the religion was problematic in that it "deviates"
and is "not mainstream."83
Dr. Greenbaum speculated about the difficulties that fouryear-old Rebecca might face in the future if she were raised as
a Jehovah's Witness but attended public school:
[A]s a Jehovah's Witness she would have difficulty in dealing
with the different values as they apply socially, in terms of
school and religious holidays, which are not perceived as
religious, exclusively by the children, such as Christmas and
in terms of saluting the flag and things of that nature. 84
Despite their reservations about Ignacio, each of the
experts testified that it would be better for Rebecca to be a
Catholic, and, therefore, raised by Ignacio and his family,
because Jehovah's Witnesses are not part of the mainstream of
society. Dr. Levy testified:
Living in this society, she needs to adapt herself to the
mainstream of culture. She is growing up and it is not a
country of Jehovah's Witnesses. If the majority of the country
was Jehovah's Witnesses, we would not have any problem,
except for physically, but, as far as - I am not making the
statement because she is a Jehovah's Witness per se, but the
philosophy of practicing the religion does not allow Rebecca to
benefit and be safeguarded in living in this culture.
I believe that being raised a Jehovah's Witness would not
be in the best interest of the child, given the fact that the
principles, the way I understand them, do not fit in the
western way of life in this society.
Q. You think it is unhealthy for a child to be a Jehovah's
Witness in this culture?
A. I say it is unhealthy for this child to be raised as a
Jehovah's Witness.
Q. Because she would not fit in the mainstream of society?
A. Yes. 85
Dr. Levy had previously testified as follows:
Not that I am stating which one is better, but living in
the western society, the part and parcel of the emotional
health is the ability of the individual to adapt to a particular
culture . . . . Bringing her up Catholic would allow her to

83 !d. at 8-9.
84 !d. at 19.
85 !d. at 21-22.
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adapt to our society and have the freedom that Catholic
children have in the society, rather than take the chance and
possibility and create a definite state in raising her as a
Jehovah's Witness. 86

The custody proceeding ended on October 2, 1985, when
Judge Philip Knight determined that it was in the ''best
interest" of Rebecca that Ignacio be her custodial parent. The
court also decreed that:
All decisions which relate to the religious training, welfare,
religious education and teaching are the duty and sole
responsibility of the husband. The wife shall not expose or
permit any other person to expose the minor child to any
religious practices, attendances, teachings or events which are
in any way inconsistent with the Catholic religion. Nor shall
the wife preclude the child from engaging in any activity
which is permitted by the Catholic religion .... 87

On April 28, 1987, Florida's District Court of Appeal, Third
District, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 88 Two
members of the three-judge panel concluded that the record did
not demonstrate that the trial court granted custody to Ignacio
solely because of Rita's religion. 89 They stated that it is the
right of a trial court, in a custody case, to consider the effect on
the child caused by conflicting religious beliefs of the
parents. 90
On November 10, 1987, the Court of Appeal denied
motions for both rehearing and rehearing en banc. 91 A
majority of the nine-judge court ruled that Mendez v. Mendez
was nothing more than a "quite ordinary'' child custody case. 92
But three others disagreed. Judge Baskin's dissent stated:
[W]hat does emerge from the record is a demonstration of
the experts' personal biases against the mother's religion.
Their disdain for the mother's religion induced them to
speculate as to the possibility of harm to the child in the
future even though no evidence of harm existed. The trial

86 Id. at 20.
87 !d. at 2-3.
88 Mendez v. Mendez, 527 So.2d 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
485 u.s. 942 (1988).
89 ld.
90 !d.
91 Id. at 822.
92 /d.
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court was obviously persuaded by their less-than-objective
considerations for removing the child from the custody of her
natural mother and its judgment should not stand.
To be forced to choose between one's religion and one's
child is repugnant to a society based on constitutional
principles. The soft voice of the minority should be audible to
a responsible court sensitive to constitutional rights which
include the right to practice an unpopular religion. 93

Because the appeals court decision did not expressly and
directly conflict with a decision by another district court of
appeal of Florida and because the appeals court refused to
certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision
of the District Court of Appeal was not appealable to the
Florida Supreme Court. 94 Therefore, a Petition For Writ of
Certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court. On
March 7, 1988, the High Court denied review. 95 Rita Mendez,
denied custody of her daughter because of her religious
practices, had no further legal recourse.
In the United States there are two distinct and divergent
lines of cases on the subject of whether the religious beliefs and
practices of parents may be considered in a child custody
dispute. One line of cases makes religion one of several factors
which may be considered by the court. 96 The second line holds
that religion may be considered only in special
circumstances. 97 The result is that the determination of one's
fitness as a parent is essentially a matter of geography.
Typical of the first line of cases is Pennsylvania's Morris
decision, which held:
[W]e are convinced that embraced within the best interests
concept is the stability and consistency of the child's spiritual
inculcation. It would be an egregious error for our courts in a

93 ld. at 824.
94 FLA. CONST. of 1980, art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1980); FLA. R. APP. P.
9.030(A)(2)(iv).
95 Mendez v. Mendez, 485 U.S. 942 (1988).
96 See, e.g., Allison v. Ovens, 421 P.2d 929 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968); Frank v. Frank, 167 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1966); Sinclair v.
Sinclair, 461 P.2d 750 (Kan. 1969); Quinn v. Franzman, 451 S.W.2d 665 (Ky.
1970); Dean v. Dean, 232 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Morris v. Morris, 412
A.2d 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
97 See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So. 2d 429 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); in re
Marriage of Murga, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498 (1980); Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr.
503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310 (Colo. 1985);
Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980).
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custody dispute to scrutinize the ability of parents to foster
the child's emotional development, their capacity to provide
adequate shelter and sustenance, and their relative income,
yet not review their respective religious beliefs. 98

Florida, unfortunately for Rita Mendez, adheres to this line of
cases.
Cases from the second line of authority hold that religion
may be considered only if there has been a showing that
specific religious beliefs or practices are contrary to the child's
general welfare. The standards range across a broad spectrum.
At one extreme is the Alabama standard:
[Q]uestions concerning religious convictions, when reasonably
related to the determination of whether the prospective
custodian's convictions might result in physical or mental
harm to the child, are proper considerations for the trial court
in a child custody proceeding. 99

From the opposite viewpoint is a California decision
requiring a showing of "actual impairment of physical,
emotional and mental well-being contrary to the best interests
of the child" before the court may even hear of the religious
beliefs of the parties. 100
Between these poles lie formulations of various state courts
that have dealt with the problem. Another California court
required a "clear affirmative showing that religious activities
will be harmful to the child."101 In Colorado, consideration of
religious beliefs and practices which are "reasonably likely to
cause present or future harm to the physical or mental
development of the child" is proper. 102 Idaho requires "a clear
and affirmative showing that the conflicting religious beliefs
affect the general welfare of the child." 103 In Maine, a court
may not consider parental religious practices unless the child's
well-being is "immediately and substantially endangered by the
religious practice in question." 104

98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Morris, 412 A.2d at 142.
Clift, 346 So.2d at 435.
Quinn, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
Short, 698 P.2d at 1313.
Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1977) (citation omitted).
Osier, 410 A.2d at 1030.
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The disparity between the two lines of authority is
significant. For instance, in Morris, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court held that "it is beyond dispute that a young child reared
into two inconsistent religious traditions will quite probably
experience some deleterious physical or mental effects. 105
Yet, Massachusetts reached an opposite conclusion:
The law ... tolerates and even encourages up to a point the
child's exposure to the religious influences of both parents
although they are divided in their faiths . . . . And it is
suggested, sometimes, that a diversity of religious experience
is itself a sound stimulant for a child. 106

Such a disparity should be resolved by the United States
Supreme Court. Precedent for such an action exists: the High
Court has previously held that courts may not consider race or
marital status in custody actions. 107 For reasons of its own
the Supreme Court did not use Mendez to extend those
holdings into the area of parental religion. Why not? Several
factors seem to have contributed to this unfortunate decision
and the High Court's refusal to hear it on appeal.
First, the current Court is suffering from significant
internal tension over the proper interpretation and application
of the First Amendment religion clauses. Because of this
tension, the Court has in the past appeared to use any pretext
to avoid hearing a divisive case involving religion. In recent
years the Court has rejected or remanded such cases as ARM v.
Baker and Oregon v. Black, 108 and sidestepped consideration
of the Equal Access Act, only to have those cases arrive at its
doorstep a second time.
But that situation is changing. On April 17, 1990, in
Employment Division v. Smith/ 09 the Supreme Court
radically undercut the reach of the Free Exercise Clause. The
Court now appears ready to approve virtually any
governmental action that is generally applicable and facially
neutral. The new standard makes the achievement of
protection for religious practices even more difficult than
before, both in custody cases and elsewhere. The Religious
105 Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
106 Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981).
107 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 658-59 (1972).
108 483 U.S. 1054 (1987).
109 494 U.S. 872 (1989).
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Freedom Restoration Act 110 will dilute the negative effect of
Smith, but its practical effect will be determined by litigation
as yet only foreseen.
Second, the trial of Mendez afforded the Court an easy
rationale for denying review-the constitutional issue was not
clearly raised by proper objection at the trial level. According to
house counsel for the Jehovah's Witnesses organization this
case exemplifies:
what can happen when one is not sufficiently prepared at
trial level. We do not make that comment to disparage the
trial attorney; rather, the trial attorney was caught off guard,
did not anticipate the prejudice which would follow the
religious testimony, and tried to 'fight fire with fire,' rather
than taking action to have the religious testimony
excluded." 111

Third, the aforementioned Florida appellate rules offered a
disinclination to grant review. The High Court usually hears
cases from the federal court system or from state supreme
courts, not from mid-level state courts of appeal.
Fourth, the possibility of simple prejudice- at all levelsagainst Jehovah's Witnesses (and other minority religions)
should not be taken lightly. In the American Law Reports
annotation, "Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and
Visitation Cases," a separate subsection treats cases involving
Jehovah's Witnesses, the only group so treated. 112
Fifth, we see in this case a reflection of perhaps the
greatest problem facing advocates of religious freedom and
equality in western societies today: government-and, by
extension, society-often does not take seriously those who take
religion seriously.
Is there a better way? Yes. It is both possible and
necessary to articulate a standard which adequately balances
the interests of all concerned.
It cannot be disputed that the state has a substantial
interest in the field of domestic relations. 113 The state
therefore has a duty to protect the welfare of minor children.
42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (1993).
Letter from James M. McCabe, House Counsel, Jehovah's Witnesses, to
A. Tyner (Sept. 22, 1989).
Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases,
22 A.L.R. 4th 971 § 9 (1983).
113 Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (citation omitted).

110
111
Mitchell
112
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Thus, where it is clearly shown that parental religious
practices endanger a child's well being, the state has a
compelling interest in safeguarding the child, and the First
Amendment does not bar the court from considering religious
practices in such cases.
Yet there are competing interests. One is the parents'
interest in safeguarding their free exercise of religion, in not
being treated as second-class or undesirable because they
adhere to an unpopular, minority religion. Another is the
interest of both parents and government (and, in a larger
sense, all Americans) in enforcing the constitutional
requirement of government neutrality; neutrality between
religions and neutrality between religion and non-religion. An
adequate standard will balance all those interests. It will
safeguard the children whose custody is at issue. It will also
guard against prejudice disguised as judicial discretion. And it
will guard against inconsistency based only on geography.
Such a standard was enunciated by the Supreme Court of
Maine in Osier v. Osier.u 4 The Osier test requires the trial
court to make a preliminary determination of the preferred
custodial parent without considering either parent's religious
practices. 115 If the result is the selection of the parent whose
religious practices are not in issue, the process ends. 116 If the
result is the selection of the other parent, the court may then
take into account the effect on the child of the challenged
religious practices, using a two-part analysis:
[F]irst, in order to assure itself that there exists a factual
situation necessitating such infringement, the court must
make a threshold factual determination that the child's
temporal well-being is immediately and substantially
endangered by the religious practice in question and, if that
threshold determination is made, second, the court must
engage in a deliberate and articulated balancing of the
conflicting interests involved, to the end that its custody order
makes the least possible infringement upon the parent's
liberty interests consistent with the child's well-being. In
carrying out that two-stage analysis, the trial court should
make, on the basis of record evidence, specific findings of fact

114 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980).
115 ld. at 1029.
116 ld.
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concerning its evaluation of all relevant considerations
bearing upon its ultimate custody order. 117

Such a standard has much to recommend it. Mter all,
"Deprivation of the custody of a child is not a 'slender' ...
punishment: it is a heavy penalty to pay for the exercise of a
religious belief." 118
IV.

CONCLUSION

Religious beliefs that are unpopular can sometimes be used
either explicitly or inadvertently for the determination of
substantive rights in all areas of family law. It should be
recognized that religious freedom could be seriously hampered
unless courts look only to the effects of the religious practices.
Even then, the standards should be the same for any other
practices when applied to domestic relations issues.

117 ld. at 1030.
118 Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).

